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22.	  Hydro-­‐Hegemons	  and	  International	  Water	  Law	  	  Rebecca	  L.	  Farnum,	  Stephanie	  Hawkins	  and	  Mia	  Tamarin	  	  
Abstract	  	  
The	  modern	  international	  legal	  regime	  governing	  nation-­‐states	  is	  intrinsically	  tied	  
to	  power.	  Power	  analyses	  thus	  play	  a	  major	  role	  in	  understanding	  international	  
law	  and	  its	  impacts	  on	  water	  access	  and	  distribution.	  Building	  on	  theories	  of	  hydro-­‐
hegemony	  (power	  relationships	  in	  transboundary	  water	  interactions),	  this	  chapter	  
examines	  the	  relationship	  between	  hydro-­‐hegemons,	  freshwater,	  and	  law.	  
Examples	  from	  river	  basins	  and	  aquifers	  around	  the	  world	  help	  analyse	  the	  
(counter-­‐)hegemonic	  potential	  of	  both	  the	  content	  and	  structure	  of	  international	  
law	  governing	  freshwater.	  Particular	  attention	  is	  given	  to	  the	  debate	  over	  whether	  
international	  law	  might	  help	  ‘level	  the	  playing	  field’	  in	  transboundary	  water	  
interactions.	  	  
	  Introduction:	  Power	  and	  International	  Law	  	  A	  chapter	  about	  power	  and	  hegemony	  may	  seem	  out	  of	  place	  in	  a	  law	  and	  policy	  handbook.	  The	  law	  is,	  after	  all,	  supposed	  to	  be	  free	  from	  politics,	  blind	  to	  its	  supplicants,	  an	  equal	  arbiter	  of	  justice.	  However,	  while	  certain	  mechanisms	  within	  legal	  frameworks	  strive	  to	  be	  apolitical,	  it	  cannot	  be	  ignored	  that	  the	  systems	  creating	  and	  upholding	  those	  frameworks	  are	  far	  from	  apolitical	  themselves.	  It	  is	  people	  who	  write	  and	  enforce	  law;	  it	  is	  states	  that	  produce	  and	  implement	  international	  law.	  International	  law	  is	  thus	  a	  product	  of	  society,	  influenced	  by	  power	  and	  politics.	  	  	  In	  his	  opening	  to	  The	  Politics	  of	  International	  Law,	  Christian	  Reus-­‐Smit	  (2004,	  3)	  demonstrates	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  international	  law,	  showing	  how	  states	  and	  other	  actors	  use	  politics	  to	  determine	  “not	  only	  ‘who	  gets	  what	  when	  and	  how’,	  but	  also	  who	  will	  be	  accepted	  as	  a	  legitimate	  actor	  and	  what	  will	  pass	  as	  rightful	  conduct”.	  International	  relations	  occur	  “within	  a	  framework	  of	  rules	  and	  norms”	  (ibid),	  but	  those	  very	  rules	  and	  norms	  are	  the	  product	  of	  states’	  behaviours	  and	  wishes.	  In	  a	  system	  created	  by	  its	  own	  users,	  politics	  and	  power	  cannot	  be	  divorced	  from	  the	  product	  or	  its	  application.	  Analysis	  of	  those	  politics	  and	  the	  way	  power	  plays	  out	  on	  the	  global	  stage	  is	  thus	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  understanding	  international	  law.	  This	  chapter	  relies	  on	  three	  related	  assumptions	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  power	  and	  law	  in	  order	  to	  examine	  the	  more	  specific	  connections	  between	  hydro-­‐hegemons,	  freshwater,	  and	  international	  water	  law:	  	   1. The	  political	  processes	  that	  create	  international	  law	  are	  shaped	  in	  large	  part	  by	  power	  relations	  between	  states;	  	  2. Legal	  norms	  and	  institutions	  often	  serve	  to	  reinforce	  existing	  power	  dynamics;	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3. Legal	  norms	  and	  institutions	  can	  be	  leveraged	  for	  or	  against	  extant	  hegemonic	  orders.	  	  International	  relations	  are	  inherently	  political,	  shaped	  by	  domestic	  pressures,	  representatives’	  rapport,	  and	  global	  events.	  While	  international	  relations	  and	  international	  law	  are	  frequently	  separated	  as	  fields	  of	  study,	  they	  are	  inextricably	  bound,	  with	  relations	  creating	  law	  and	  law	  informing	  relations	  (Reus-­‐Smit	  2014).	  While	  all	  states	  are,	  in	  principal,	  equal,	  there	  exist	  “firsts	  among	  equals”	  in	  global	  politics.	  The	  five	  permanent	  seats	  on	  the	  United	  Nations	  (UN)	  Security	  Council	  are	  a	  prime	  example.	  The	  Security	  Council	  is	  one	  of	  the	  few	  international	  institutions	  that	  can	  produce	  legally	  binding	  resolutions,	  yet	  only	  permanent	  members	  wield	  veto	  power,	  giving	  those	  states	  more	  power	  over	  the	  production	  of	  international	  law.	  This	  power	  imbalance	  reflects	  political	  processes	  and	  directly	  impacts	  international	  law’s	  content,	  scope,	  and	  applicability.	  	  	  Ideally,	  “law	  is	  the	  protector	  of	  the	  weak”	  (Frederick	  Schiller).	  Too	  often,	  though,	  it	  seems	  that	  “[t]he	  function	  of	  the	  law	  is	  not	  to	  provide	  justice	  or	  to	  preserve	  freedom.	  The	  function	  of	  the	  law	  is	  to	  keep	  those	  who	  hold	  power,	  in	  power”	  (Spence	  1996,	  90).	  The	  international	  legal	  system	  has	  come	  a	  long	  way	  since	  the	  1648	  Treaty	  of	  Westphalia	  and	  1945	  founding	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,	  but	  the	  world	  system	  is	  still	  technically	  anarchic.	  Under	  the	  Westphalian	  model	  of	  social	  organisation,	  states	  have	  theoretical	  sovereignty	  over	  their	  territories	  and	  there	  is	  no	  greater	  power	  than	  the	  nation-­‐state.	  A	  citizen	  of	  a	  country	  is	  bound	  to	  that	  country’s	  laws	  whether	  she	  wishes	  or	  not.	  In	  contrast,	  states	  are	  not	  answerable	  to	  a	  force	  higher	  than	  themselves:	  the	  collective	  international	  community	  of	  states.	  International	  law	  emanating	  from	  treaties	  and	  rulings	  from	  the	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice	  (ICJ)	  are	  applicable	  and	  enforceable	  only	  with	  states’	  voluntary	  compliance	  (see	  Crawford	  2012).	  This	  requirement	  of	  consent	  is	  a	  core	  principle	  of	  international	  law.	  As	  this	  chapter	  demonstrates,	  principles	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  consent	  embody	  formal	  equality	  in	  the	  face	  of	  considerable	  inequality.	  The	  political	  nature	  of	  international	  legal	  creation,	  along	  with	  the	  system’s	  imperial	  origins,	  gives	  rise	  to	  international	  legal	  norms	  and	  systems	  that	  generally	  benefit	  and	  reflect	  the	  worldview	  and	  values	  of	  the	  powerful.	  International	  law	  thus	  becomes	  another	  avenue	  through	  which	  powerful	  actors	  wield	  their	  influence	  –	  and	  acquire	  more.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  law	  is	  created	  through	  political	  processes	  dominated	  by	  powerful	  players	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  bode	  well	  for	  the	  ability	  of	  international	  law	  to	  rein	  in	  domineering	  states	  or	  protect	  weaker	  states	  from	  bullying	  hegemons.	  However,	  the	  international	  legal	  requirements	  of	  notification	  and	  environmental	  impact	  assessment	  for	  major	  projects,	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  activists	  make	  claims	  based	  on	  legal	  rights	  to	  campaign	  for	  vulnerable	  populations,	  and	  the	  growing	  power	  of	  the	  ICJ	  despite	  its	  potential	  to	  limit	  state	  sovereignty	  all	  suggest	  that	  the	  law	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  tool	  in	  counter-­‐hegemonic	  efforts.	  	  This	  chapter	  builds	  from	  these	  ideas	  to	  explore	  how	  the	  Framework	  of	  Hydro-­‐Hegemony	  intersects	  with	  international	  law.	  Particular	  attention	  is	  given	  to	  geographical	  context;	  the	  principles	  of	  equitable	  and	  reasonable	  use,	  no	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significant	  harm,	  and	  sovereignty;	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  international	  law;	  and	  procedural	  matters.	  The	  chapter	  will	  conclude	  by	  comparing	  lessons	  from	  across	  the	  given	  examples	  and	  identifying	  weaknesses	  in	  international	  water	  law	  and	  hydro-­‐hegemony	  that	  this	  analysis	  reveals.	  	  
Power	  Analysis,	  International	  Relations,	  and	  Freshwater:	  The	  Framework	  
of	  Hydro-­‐Hegemony	  
	  
Hegemony	  is	  a	  concept	  from	  politics	  and	  international	  relations	  referring	  to	  leadership	  and	  rule.	  A	  hegemon	  is	  an	  actor	  or	  group	  of	  actors	  with	  authority	  in	  their	  sphere.	  The	  famous	  theorist	  of	  hegemony,	  Antonio	  Gramsci,	  argued	  that	  Mussolini’s	  Fascist	  regime	  in	  Italy	  was	  upheld	  not	  only	  through	  the	  state’s	  brute	  force	  but	  also	  through	  cultural	  institutions,	  with	  the	  ruling	  class	  maintaining	  power	  through	  the	  reproduction	  of	  “common	  sense”	  ideas.	  “Hegemony”	  goes	  beyond	  domination	  (leadership	  built	  on	  brute	  force)	  to	  become	  leadership	  upheld	  through	  authority	  and	  consent.	  	  
Hydro-­‐hegemony	  refers	  to	  hegemony	  at	  the	  river	  basin	  level,	  wherein	  one	  state,	  or	  a	  bloc	  of	  states,	  has	  more	  control	  over	  water	  flows	  and	  usage	  than	  other	  riparians.	  The	  Framework	  of	  Hydro-­‐Hegemony	  (FHH)	  was	  developed	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  “who	  gets	  how	  much	  water,	  how	  and	  why”	  (Zeitoun	  and	  Warner	  2006,	  435).	  The	  FHH	  is	  rooted	  in	  international	  relations	  literature	  on	  power	  analysis,	  hegemony	  theories	  and	  security	  studies.	  Much	  of	  that	  literature	  assumes	  a	  simplistic	  dualism	  of	  conflict	  and	  cooperation	  leading	  to	  either	  absolute	  control	  or	  equal	  co-­‐management.	  In	  contrast,	  hydro-­‐hegemony	  theorists	  argue	  that	  the	  outcomes	  of	  transboundary	  water	  distribution	  result	  from	  varying	  configurations	  of	  complex	  political	  interplays	  between	  interested	  actors.	  To	  analyse	  the	  nuances	  of	  these	  interplays,	  the	  FHH	  adapts	  Lukes’	  (1974)	  theory	  of	  power.	  	  Building	  from	  Lukes,	  political	  and	  social	  scientists	  suggest	  three	  ‘faces’	  of	  how	  power	  is	  operationalised:	  material,	  bargaining,	  and	  ideational.	  The	  most	  obvious	  of	  these	  forms	  is	  material	  power,	  the	  capacity	  of	  an	  actor	  to	  tangibly	  achieve	  their	  interests	  through	  physical	  or	  economic	  force.	  States	  with	  greater	  abilities	  to	  extract	  or	  divert	  water	  from	  a	  basin	  and	  the	  military	  capability	  to	  destroy	  unwanted	  infrastructure	  on	  the	  river	  have	  more	  material	  power.	  	  The	  second	  dimension,	  bargaining	  power,	  revolves	  around	  the	  ability	  to	  control	  the	  “rules	  of	  the	  game”	  (Zeitoun	  and	  Warner	  2006,	  442),	  influencing	  the	  agenda	  and	  what	  is	  and	  is	  not	  on	  the	  negotiating	  table.	  The	  chairperson	  of	  a	  River	  Basin	  Organisation	  (RBO)	  wields	  bargaining	  power	  as	  she	  determines	  what	  will	  and	  will	  not	  be	  discussed	  during	  a	  meeting.	  Without	  recognition	  from	  the	  chairperson,	  a	  state	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  bring	  proposals	  to	  the	  RBO	  for	  consideration,	  much	  less	  implementation.	  	  	  The	  third	  dimension	  of	  power	  is	  the	  most	  difficult	  to	  concretely	  grasp,	  and	  also	  probably	  the	  most	  difficult	  to	  counteract.	  Through	  ideational	  power,	  hegemons	  influence	  ideas	  and	  assumptions	  –	  not	  merely	  their	  own,	  but	  also	  other	  actors’.	  The	  third	  dimension	  is	  the	  capacity	  to	  create,	  uphold,	  and	  destroy	  narratives,	  
published in the Routledge Handbook of Water Law and Policy  Farnum, Hawkins, and Tamarin 
4 
 
perceptions,	  and	  knowledge.	  The	  core	  organisation	  of	  the	  world	  by	  nation-­‐states	  is	  a	  hegemonic	  concept	  backed	  up	  by	  ideational	  power.	  That	  states	  should	  be	  the	  primary	  actors	  governing	  transboundary	  basins	  is	  ‘common	  sense’	  in	  the	  current	  global	  order.	  The	  ideational	  power	  of	  the	  state	  system	  is	  demonstrated	  by	  how	  few	  people	  actively	  consider	  or	  work	  towards	  alternatives.	  	  	  The	  last	  two	  dimensions	  of	  power	  –	  bargaining	  and	  ideational	  –	  are	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  “soft	  power”	  (see	  Nye	  2004).	  In	  contrast,	  the	  first,	  material	  face	  is	  often	  called	  “hard	  power”.	  Both	  soft	  and	  hard	  powers	  play	  a	  role	  in	  determining	  water	  distribution	  outcomes	  and	  reinforcing	  or	  countering	  hydro-­‐hegemony	  within	  basins.	  	  Power	  is	  seen	  in	  the	  FHH	  as	  the	  “prime	  determinant	  enabling	  the	  successful	  execution	  of	  the	  water	  resource	  control”	  (Zeitoun	  and	  Warner	  2006,	  451).	  To	  illustrate	  the	  significance	  of	  differing	  kinds	  of	  power	  and	  analyse	  where	  and	  how	  power	  is	  held	  and	  employed	  within	  river	  basin	  relations,	  the	  FHH	  suggests	  four	  ‘pillars’	  of	  power	  useful	  in	  evaluating	  how	  states	  exert	  influence	  over	  shared	  waters	  (Figure	  1).	  In	  addition	  to	  Lukes’	  (1974)	  three	  faces	  of	  power,	  the	  FHH	  includes	  geography	  (the	  position	  of	  a	  state	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  watercourse)	  as	  an	  influential	  force	  in	  hydropolitics.	  The	  relationship	  between	  international	  law	  and	  these	  four	  pillars	  will	  now	  be	  explored.	  	  
	  
Figure	  1.	  The	  Revised	  Pillars	  of	  Hydro-­‐Hegemony	  	  
(Cascão	  &	  Zeitoun	  2010,	  32)	  	  	  
International	  Law	  as	  Soft	  Power	  and	  a	  Tool	  of	  (Counter-­‐)Hegemony	  	  Hydro-­‐hegemony	  and	  international	  law	  are	  powerfully	  connected,	  with	  law	  frequently	  used	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  both	  reproduce	  and	  resist	  hydro-­‐hegemonic	  realities.	  Hydro-­‐hegemons	  have	  greater	  levels	  of	  authority	  and	  influence	  to	  ensure	  that	  processes	  and	  outcomes	  of	  water	  distribution	  manifest	  in	  their	  favour.	  These	  hydro-­‐hegemons	  exist,	  to	  some	  degree,	  in	  virtually	  every	  transboundary	  water	  relationship.	  It	  is	  no	  surprise	  that	  stronger	  players	  “win	  the	  game”	  more	  frequently.	  Weaker	  players	  in	  transboundary	  water	  relations	  are	  typically	  constrained	  in	  their	  actions	  by	  the	  hydro-­‐hegemon’s	  interest,	  as	  hegemons	  wield	  their	  power	  through	  a	  variety	  of	  compliance-­‐producing	  mechanisms	  (“carrots”)	  and	  authoritarian	  strategies	  (“sticks”).	  Even	  so,	  non-­‐hydro-­‐hegemonic	  riparian	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states	  hold	  the	  potential	  to	  push	  against	  both	  the	  carrots	  and	  sticks.	  Cascão’s	  (2008)	  work	  on	  “counter-­‐hegemony”	  explores	  how	  non-­‐hegemonic	  states	  might	  resist	  hegemonic	  control.	  Various	  studies	  and	  theorisations	  suggest	  that	  soft	  forms	  of	  power	  are	  particularly	  useful	  tools	  for	  non-­‐hegemons	  (Zeitoun	  et	  al	  2011;	  Cascão	  and	  Zeitoun	  2010).	  It	  is	  primarily	  through	  this	  emphasis	  on	  soft	  power	  that	  issues	  of	  international	  law	  clearly	  come	  into	  questions	  of	  hydro-­‐hegemony.	  	  	  The	  ability	  to	  create,	  write,	  and	  influence	  international	  law	  straddles	  bargaining	  and	  ideational	  powers.	  As	  a	  repository	  and	  creator	  of	  ideas,	  international	  law	  is	  a	  tool	  and	  actor	  in	  ideational	  power;	  as	  a	  repository	  of	  international	  “rules”,	  it	  is	  a	  tool	  and	  actor	  in	  bargaining	  power.	  This	  power	  is	  held	  and	  utilised	  by	  academics	  and	  lawyers	  via	  the	  drafting	  of	  articles;	  activists,	  corporations,	  and	  civil	  society	  leaders	  in	  their	  campaigns;	  and	  states	  themselves	  through	  their	  participation	  in	  treaty	  making	  and	  in	  organisation	  such	  as	  the	  United	  Nations.	  Appeals	  to	  international	  law,	  including	  claims	  about	  either	  the	  “rightness”	  or	  “wrongness”	  of	  a	  riparian’s	  actions,	  are	  a	  component	  of	  bargaining	  power.	  A	  study	  of	  165	  territorial	  disputes	  since	  1945	  found	  that	  actors	  with	  strong	  legal	  claims	  were	  more	  than	  twice	  as	  likely	  to	  seek	  negotiations	  before	  using	  force	  (Huth	  et	  al	  2011).	  This	  suggests	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  “battle”	  using	  bargaining	  power	  in	  “lawfare”	  in	  addition	  to	  (or	  instead	  of)	  material	  power	  in	  warfare	  (Kennedy	  2012).	  	  	  International	  law	  reflects	  and	  reproduces	  global	  discourses	  on	  issues,	  influencing	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  policy.	  It	  shapes	  and	  perpetuates	  norms	  of	  behaviour.	  As	  such,	  international	  law	  wields	  significant	  soft	  power	  –	  and	  thus	  influences	  hydro-­‐hegemonic	  relations	  –	  even	  when	  it	  does	  not	  carry	  with	  it	  a	  strong	  global	  police	  force	  with	  hard	  power	  (Daoudy	  2008).	  It	  can	  be	  argued,	  however,	  that	  there	  is	  also	  a	  material	  element	  to	  the	  intersection	  between	  international	  law	  and	  hydro-­‐hegemony:	  the	  unequal	  capacity	  of	  states	  to	  employ	  lawyers.	  The	  ambiguity	  of	  much	  of	  international	  law	  leaves	  room	  for	  “duelling	  experts”	  to	  determine	  the	  winner	  of	  a	  legal	  dispute	  over	  international	  waters.	  In	  such	  cases,	  countries	  with	  greater	  fiscal	  resources	  and	  legal	  capacity	  are	  likely	  to	  triumph.	  	  Soft	  power	  is	  far	  from	  the	  only	  issue	  in	  hydro-­‐hegemony,	  and	  those	  with	  the	  soundest	  legal	  arguments	  will	  not	  always	  prevail	  over	  an	  otherwise	  dominating	  power.	  However,	  international	  law	  is	  a	  significant	  source	  of	  soft	  power,	  and	  soft	  power	  is	  relevant	  to	  hydro-­‐hegemonic	  relations	  and	  analyses.	  The	  next	  sections	  consider	  how	  some	  of	  the	  core	  principles	  and	  procedures	  of	  international	  law	  are	  being	  leveraged	  both	  by	  hydro-­‐hegemons	  to	  further	  consolidate	  their	  position	  and	  by	  non-­‐hydro-­‐hegemons	  to	  counter	  the	  status	  quo.	  	  
Geographical	  Context	  and	  its	  Influence	  on	  Hydro-­‐Hegemony	  	  The	  original	  FHH	  included	  three	  pillars,	  with	  all	  three	  faces	  of	  power	  in	  one	  pillar,	  and	  “Riparian	  Position”	  and	  “Exploitation	  Potential”	  receiving	  dedicated	  attention	  in	  the	  others.	  In	  the	  revised	  conceptualisation	  (Figure	  1),	  power	  is	  nuanced	  as	  each	  face	  gets	  its	  own	  pillar	  and	  “Geography”	  gets	  the	  fourth.	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  Geographical	  factors	  are	  also	  considered	  in	  international	  water	  law:	  Article	  6	  of	  the	  1997	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Non-­‐navigational	  Uses	  of	  International	  Watercourses	  (UN	  Watercourses	  Convention	  1997),	  for	  example,	  includes	  explicit	  attention	  to	  “[g]eographic,	  hydrographic,	  hydrological,	  climatic,	  ecological	  and	  other	  factors	  of	  a	  natural	  character”,	  when	  weighing	  up	  the	  factors	  that	  States	  might	  take	  into	  account	  in	  determining	  what	  constitutes	  an	  equitable	  and	  reasonable	  use	  of	  an	  international	  watercourse.	  This	  section	  examines	  the	  influence	  of	  geographical	  considerations,	  most	  obviously	  riparian	  position	  for	  river	  basins	  and	  exploitation	  potential	  for	  aquifers,	  on	  hydro-­‐hegemonic	  relations.	  As	  will	  be	  demonstrated,	  geography	  creates	  an	  important	  context	  for	  the	  way	  in	  which	  states	  draw	  upon	  the	  principles	  of	  international	  water	  law.	  	  
Geography	  and	  River	  Basins	  	  The	  geographical	  factor	  most	  pertinent	  to	  hydro-­‐hegemony	  in	  river	  basins	  is	  riparian	  position,	  whether	  a	  state	  is	  upstream	  or	  downstream	  of	  its	  neighbours	  sharing	  the	  river.	  Upstream	  states	  can	  theoretically	  use	  all	  of	  the	  water	  from	  what	  would	  otherwise	  be	  a	  shared	  resource.	  In	  the	  1890s,	  Mexico	  complained	  of	  United	  States	  (US)	  practices	  wastefully	  diverting	  water	  from	  the	  The	  Rio	  Grande	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  downstream	  users.	  At	  the	  time,	  the	  US	  Attorney	  General	  asserted	  absolute	  territorial	  sovereignty	  (the	  Harmon	  Doctrine),	  claiming	  the	  US	  had	  no	  obligation	  under	  international	  law	  to	  restrict	  the	  use	  of	  territorial	  waters.	  	  Today,	  international	  water	  law	  has	  evolved	  such	  that	  the	  principles	  of	  equitable	  and	  reasonable	  utilisation	  (ERU)	  and	  no	  significant	  harm	  (NSH)	  signify	  limited	  territorial	  sovereignty.	  Through	  this	  theory	  of	  riparian	  rights,	  states	  may	  use	  water	  from	  a	  common	  source	  provided	  their	  use	  does	  not	  unreasonably	  interfere	  with	  other	  riparian	  states’	  uses.	  Limited	  territorial	  sovereignty	  could	  be	  said	  to	  be	  a	  counter-­‐hegemonic	  tool	  for	  downstream	  riparians	  like	  Mexico,	  allowing	  them	  to	  counter	  the	  upstream	  hydro-­‐hegemon’s	  claims	  to	  absolute	  sovereignty.	  	  	  However,	  not	  all	  hydro-­‐hegemons	  are	  upstream.	  In	  the	  Ganges-­‐Brahmaputra-­‐Meghna	  River	  Basin,	  India	  is	  the	  clear	  hydro-­‐hegemon	  even	  as	  Nepal	  is	  the	  uppermost	  riparian.	  Nepal	  and	  Bhutan	  share	  water	  but	  not	  a	  border,	  with	  India	  cutting	  between	  them.	  This	  significantly	  limits	  negotiation	  potential	  between	  the	  two	  weaker	  parties.	  This	  also	  emphasises	  the	  need	  for	  careful	  consideration	  of	  legal	  language:	  “shared	  river”/	  “transboundary	  river”	  and	  “transboundary”/	  “transgovernmental”	  are	  not	  necessarily	  synonymous	  pairs	  in	  all	  basins,	  and	  can	  affect	  the	  applicable	  scope	  of	  legal	  rules.	  For	  example,	  the	  language	  “transboundary”	  frames	  international	  problems	  as	  occurring	  only	  at	  the	  border,	  undermining	  the	  regional	  issues	  inherent	  in	  the	  use	  of	  international	  watercourses,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  “genuinely	  global	  dimension	  of	  local	  ecosystem	  health”	  (Conca	  2006,	  16).	  The	  language	  “shared”,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  requiring	  allocation	  of	  volumes	  of	  water,	  and	  indeed	  the	  recent	  bilateral	  Agreement	  between	  Jordan	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia	  relating	  to	  the	  Management	  and	  Utilisation	  of	  the	  Groundwaters	  in	  the	  Al-­‐Sag/	  Al-­‐Disi	  Layer	  (2015)	  -­‐	  that	  neglects	  to	  allocate	  water	  volumes	  -­‐	  avoids	  this	  language	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  term	  “joint”.	  The	  language	  that	  denotes	  the	  geographical	  scope	  of	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international	  legal	  frameworks	  is	  intrinsically	  linked	  to	  power,	  since	  it	  prescribes	  who	  is	  included	  in,	  and	  excluded	  from,	  international	  negotiations	  over	  freshwater.	  	  The	  case	  of	  the	  Ganges-­‐Brahmaputra-­‐Meghna	  River	  Basin	  provides	  an	  example	  of	  the	  consequences	  of	  such	  geographical	  framing,	  as	  well	  as	  demonstrating	  that	  the	  ideas	  of	  ERU	  and	  NSH	  (See	  “Equitable	  and	  Reasonable	  Use,	  No	  Significant	  
Harm,	  and	  Sovereignty”	  below),	  so	  useful	  for	  some	  non-­‐hegemons,	  can	  be	  used	  by	  a	  hydro-­‐hegemon	  to	  further	  cement	  its	  position.	  In	  the	  water-­‐sharing	  Ganges	  Treaty	  (1996)	  between	  India	  and	  Bangladesh,	  claims	  to	  “do	  no	  harm”	  and	  “reasonable	  use”	  are	  made,	  but	  disingenuously	  so,	  in	  ways	  that	  do	  not	  truly	  limit	  India’s	  hydro-­‐hegemonic	  potential	  (Hanasz	  2014).	  Nepal,	  the	  upstream	  riparian,	  is	  not	  included	  in	  the	  agreement.	  This	  emphasises	  that	  geographic	  context	  is	  an	  element	  rather	  than	  a	  determining	  factor	  in	  hydro-­‐hegemony.	  	  
Geography	  and	  Aquifers	  	  The	  original	  FHH	  was	  developed	  to	  analyse	  power	  relations	  between	  states	  at	  the	  basin	  level,	  with	  the	  river	  as	  the	  primary	  unit	  of	  water	  under	  consideration.	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  being	  ‘out	  of	  sight,	  therefore	  out	  of	  mind’,	  groundwater	  and	  aquifers	  has	  been	  largely	  ignored	  in	  hydro-­‐hegemony	  theory,	  and	  has	  only	  recently	  gained	  more	  explicit	  attention	  in	  international	  legal	  instruments.	  For	  example,	  the	  International	  Law	  Commission’s	  (ILC)	  Draft	  Articles	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Transboundary	  Aquifers	  (Draft	  Aquifer	  Articles	  2008)	  only	  recently	  brought	  aquifers	  explicitly	  into	  the	  international	  legal	  framework	  for	  freshwater.	  This	  instrument	  also	  includes	  the	  ERU	  and	  NSH	  principles	  with	  attention	  to	  “natural	  characteristics”.	  	  Geographic	  issues	  are	  arguably,	  though	  not	  necessarily	  characteristically,	  different	  between	  surface	  and	  groundwater.	  The	  FHH’s	  focus	  on	  surface	  water	  and	  riparian	  position	  has	  led	  to	  an	  underappreciation	  of	  issues	  pertinent	  to	  aquifers.	  This	  chapter	  does	  not	  go	  into	  depth	  about	  the	  hydrogeological	  and	  legal	  differences	  between	  surface	  water	  and	  groundwater.	  Nor	  does	  it	  explore	  whether	  there	  are	  significantly	  different	  hegemony	  considerations	  for	  surface	  water	  and	  groundwater,	  since	  the	  water	  contained	  in	  both	  carry	  similar	  distributive	  concerns.	  Instead,	  it	  argues	  that	  the	  original	  FHH’s	  “Exploitation	  Potential”	  pillar	  can	  be	  read	  into	  the	  “Geography”	  and	  “Material	  Power”	  elements	  of	  the	  revised	  framework;	  from	  this	  angle,	  hydro-­‐hegemony	  specific	  to	  groundwater	  and	  aquifers	  can	  be	  considered.	  	  	  Geographical	  factors	  like	  the	  depth	  of	  the	  water	  table,	  direction	  of	  flow,	  location	  of	  recharge	  and	  discharge	  zones,	  and	  amount	  of	  territory	  a	  state	  has	  over	  an	  aquifer	  influence	  the	  ease	  and	  cost	  of	  abstraction.	  The	  extent	  of	  this	  control	  by	  a	  state	  is	  then	  determined	  by	  the	  economic	  and	  technical	  capacity.	  	  	  This	  relationship	  between	  geological	  ease	  of	  abstraction	  and	  technical-­‐financial	  capacity	  is	  a	  two-­‐way	  street,	  as	  pumping	  can	  alter	  flow	  directions	  and	  speeds,	  altering	  ease	  of	  abstraction	  in	  other	  places.	  Given	  this	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  flow	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dynamics	  can	  take	  different	  speeds	  and	  direction	  through	  various	  aquifer	  layers,	  state	  relationships	  over	  aquifers	  quickly	  become	  complicated.	  	  As	  international	  law	  over	  aquifers	  is	  still	  emerging	  and	  the	  subject	  of	  much	  debate,	  regional	  agreements	  are	  particularly	  important	  in	  current	  considerations	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  geography,	  aquifers,	  hydro-­‐hegemony,	  and	  international	  law.	  	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Ceylanpınar	  (Ra’s	  al	  'Ayn	  in	  Arabic)	  Aquifer	  shared	  between	  Turkey	  and	  Syria,	  over-­‐exploitation	  by	  increased	  use	  and	  unlicensed	  wells	  in	  both	  countries	  has	  led	  to	  increased	  water	  deficits	  and	  reduced	  flows	  to	  the	  Khabour	  River	  (Öztan	  and	  Axelrod	  2011).	  However,	  as	  the	  recharge	  zone	  lies	  predominantly	  in	  Turkey,	  Turkey	  has	  more	  control	  over	  the	  aquifer’s	  management	  for	  continued	  use.	  As	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  aquifer	  lies	  under	  Turkish	  territory,	  Turkey	  also	  has	  more	  exploitation	  opportunities	  than	  Syria.	  This	  uneven	  geographical	  situation	  and	  the	  countries’	  disparate	  economic	  power	  mean	  that	  exploitation	  potential	  is	  critically	  unequal.	  	  	  Another	  example	  includes	  the	  Disi	  Aquifer	  shared	  by	  Jordan	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia.	  The	  aquifer	  has	  low	  permeability	  and	  negligible	  recharge,	  with	  its	  finite	  resources	  leading	  to	  a	  silent	  pumping	  race	  between	  the	  two	  states	  (Ferragina	  and	  Greco	  2008).	  The	  recent	  Disi	  Aquifer	  Agreement	  (2015)	  restricts	  exploitation	  only	  in	  the	  relatively	  small	  buffer	  zone	  at	  the	  international	  border.	  Since	  Saudi	  Arabia	  has	  a	  significantly	  larger	  portion	  of	  the	  aquifer	  under	  its	  territory,	  Saudi	  Arabia’s	  current	  exploitation	  is	  relatively	  unaffected,	  and	  the	  practical	  implications	  of	  the	  treaty	  are	  far	  from	  equitable.	  	  A	  considerable	  proportion	  (around	  94%)	  of	  the	  groundwater	  exploitation	  happening	  within	  the	  Guarani	  Aquifer	  System	  is	  taking	  place	  within	  Brazil,	  the	  clear	  regional	  hegemon	  in	  Latin	  America	  (for	  more	  on	  this	  issue,	  see	  the	  Guarani	  Aquifer	  Strategic	  Action	  Programme	  2009).	  With	  the	  principle	  of	  sovereignty	  underpinning	  the	  Guarani	  Aquifer	  Agreement	  (2010),	  the	  regional	  treaty	  maintains	  and	  promotes	  the	  hydro-­‐hegemonic	  status	  quo.	  	  In	  the	  case	  studies	  above,	  inequalities	  created	  largely	  by	  geographic	  factors	  demonstrate	  how	  legal	  rules	  focused	  on	  contextual	  situations	  can	  further	  or	  help	  mitigate	  hegemonic	  relationships.	  Geography	  and	  the	  hard	  power	  of	  technical	  and	  economic	  capacity	  thus	  remain	  relevant	  in	  hydro-­‐hegemonic	  analysis	  and	  the	  practical	  implications	  of	  international	  water	  law.	  The	  next	  section	  will	  explore	  how	  these	  and	  other	  factors	  play	  out	  in	  states’	  use	  of	  soft	  power	  through	  a	  more	  detailed	  consideration	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  ERU,	  NSH,	  and	  sovereignty.	  	  
Equitable	  and	  Reasonable	  Use,	  No	  Significant	  Harm,	  and	  Sovereignty:	  
(Counter-­‐)Hydro-­‐Hegemonic	  Bargaining	  Tools	  	  The	  duty	  to	  ensure	  ERU	  and	  NSH	  when	  utilising	  a	  watercourse	  are	  the	  primary	  principles	  of	  international	  water	  law.	  They	  are	  now	  legally	  binding	  on	  state	  signatories	  to	  the	  UN	  Watercourses	  Convention	  (1997)	  and	  form	  the	  bedrock	  of	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multiple	  bi-­‐	  and	  multi-­‐lateral	  agreements.	  However,	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  principles	  are	  used	  and	  interpreted	  varies	  widely	  across	  states.	  	  	  The	  principle	  of	  ERU	  acts	  as	  the	  legal	  entitlement	  of	  riparian	  rights	  with	  NSH	  as	  the	  regulatory	  check,	  though	  there	  has	  been	  historical	  disagreement	  between	  states	  over	  their	  interaction	  and	  which	  should	  be	  prioritised	  (Wouters	  1999).	  The	  two	  are	  generally	  seen	  as	  conflicting,	  with	  states	  emphasising	  one	  and	  understating	  the	  other	  according	  to	  their	  preferences.	  A	  lower	  riparian	  state	  would	  supposedly	  favour	  the	  principle	  of	  NSH	  to	  protect	  against	  the	  use	  from	  upstream	  states.	  Upper	  riparian	  users	  are	  likely	  to	  favour	  the	  principle	  of	  ERU,	  which	  provides	  more	  scope	  to	  make	  use	  of	  water	  without	  consideration	  for	  downstream	  users	  (Salman	  2007).	  	  ERU	  in	  the	  UN	  Watercourses	  Convention	  (1997,	  Article	  5)	  and	  the	  ILC	  Draft	  Aquifer	  Articles	  (2008,	  Article	  4)	  requires	  that	  states	  use	  and	  develop	  a	  watercourse	  taking	  into	  account	  all	  watercourse	  states	  concerned.	  Article	  6	  of	  the	  UN	  Watercourses	  Convention	  (1997)	  and	  Article	  5	  of	  the	  ILC	  Draft	  Aquifer	  Articles	  (2008)	  both	  list	  a	  series	  of	  factors	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  determining	  ERU,	  including	  social,	  economic,	  cultural	  and	  historical	  considerations.	  However,	  this	  list	  of	  factors	  is	  flexible.	  Just	  as	  states	  stress	  NSH	  or	  ERU	  in	  accordance	  with	  their	  preferences,	  they	  emphasise	  those	  ERU	  factors	  most	  helpful	  to	  their	  agendas.	  As	  a	  result,	  claims	  tend	  to	  balance	  each	  other	  out	  legally,	  with	  an	  absence	  of	  legal	  hierarchy	  over	  factors	  leading	  to	  maintenance	  of	  the	  status	  quo	  (Lankford	  2013).	  	  The	  Nile	  River	  Basin	  is	  a	  particularly	  interesting	  case	  study	  for	  hydro-­‐hegemony	  and	  international	  law.	  Egypt	  has	  historically	  been	  the	  hydro-­‐hegemon,	  with	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  control	  over	  the	  waters	  of	  the	  Nile	  despite	  its	  downstream	  position.	  By	  emphasising	  the	  extant	  uses,	  dependent	  population,	  and	  socioeconomic	  needs	  factors	  of	  ERU,	  Egypt	  leverages	  international	  water	  law	  to	  legitimise	  its	  continued	  role	  as	  receiving	  the	  lion’s	  share	  of	  the	  Nile’s	  waters.	  Upstream	  states,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  can	  make	  claims	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  ERU’s	  focus	  on	  natural	  factors	  and	  potential	  uses	  in	  their	  arguments.	  The	  equivocality	  of	  ERU	  thus	  allows	  for	  its	  use	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  both	  hydro-­‐hegemony	  and	  counter-­‐hydro-­‐hegemony.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  use	  of	  these	  principles,	  involvement	  in	  their	  formation	  illustrates	  how	  states	  seek	  to	  use	  international	  water	  law	  to	  further	  their	  positions	  –	  and	  ensure	  other	  states	  do	  not	  gain	  additional	  bargaining	  power.	  	  	  For	  example,	  in	  comments	  preceding	  the	  General	  Assembly’s	  adoption	  of	  the	  ILC	  Draft	  Aquifer	  Articles	  (2008),	  Brazil	  pushed	  for	  the	  NSH	  principle	  to	  be	  interpreted	  as	  an	  obligation	  of	  “conduct”	  and	  not	  one	  of	  “result”	  (ILC	  2008,	  30),	  further	  advocating	  that	  the	  obligation	  to	  prevent,	  reduce	  and	  control	  pollution	  should	  not	  result	  in	  “undue	  hardship”	  on	  origin	  states	  disproportionate	  to	  the	  benefits	  of	  potentially	  harmed	  states	  (ILC	  2008,	  37).	  Similarly,	  Turkey	  appealed	  to	  weaken	  the	  obligation	  of	  NSH	  by	  suggesting	  that	  the	  phrase	  “shall	  try”	  replace	  “shall	  take	  all	  appropriate	  measures”	  (ILC	  2008,	  32).	  Portugal,	  a	  non-­‐hydro-­‐hegemon,	  expressed	  concern	  over	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  definition	  for	  “significant	  harm”	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and	  argued	  that	  there	  is	  “danger	  in	  leaving	  such	  subjective	  terms	  to	  be	  interpreted	  by	  States	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis,	  in	  accordance	  with	  their	  own	  interests	  of	  the	  moment.	  In	  fact,	  it	  may	  create	  an	  unjustified	  disadvantage	  to	  weaker	  States”	  (ILC	  2008,	  21).	  	  Sovereignty	  is	  a	  central	  international	  legal	  principle,	  but	  one	  that	  has	  a	  complex	  place	  in	  international	  water	  law.	  While	  the	  principles	  of	  ERU	  and	  NSH	  have	  effectively	  restricted	  sovereignty	  as	  a	  legitimate	  justification	  of	  unrestricted	  water	  utilisation,	  the	  ILC	  Draft	  Aquifer	  Articles	  (2008)	  actually	  emphasise	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  aquifer	  states.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  aquifer	  utilisation,	  sovereignty	  is	  now	  part	  of	  the	  ‘toolbox’	  of	  bargaining	  power	  that	  states	  can	  use	  in	  their	  hydro-­‐hegemonic	  and	  counter-­‐hydro-­‐hegemonic	  efforts	  (more	  on	  this	  divergence	  around	  the	  sovereignty	  principle	  is	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  section).	  	  Sovereignty	  as	  sustained	  in	  Article	  3	  of	  the	  ILC	  Draft	  Aquifer	  Articles	  (2008)	  can	  be	  used	  to	  lessen	  states’	  responsibilities	  toward	  their	  neighbours	  and	  has	  been	  advocated	  for	  by	  various	  hydro-­‐hegemons,	  including	  Turkey	  (ILC	  2008,	  22).	  Brazil	  expressed	  its	  support	  for	  the	  inclusion	  of	  sovereignty	  as	  “fundamental”	  (ILC	  2008,	  22),	  claiming	  the	  need	  “to	  maintain	  such	  a	  balance	  and	  avoid	  excessive	  restrictions	  to	  legitimate	  activities”	  (ILC	  2008,	  8).	  Non-­‐hegemons	  might	  try	  to	  leverage	  the	  sovereignty	  principle	  for	  counter-­‐hydro-­‐hegemonic	  action	  by	  using	  it	  to	  prevent	  interference	  from	  other	  states’	  aquifer	  utilisation.	  However,	  such	  use	  could	  inadvertently	  support	  unrestricted	  resource	  rights,	  creating	  a	  claim-­‐counter-­‐claim	  culture	  with	  no	  objective	  mediator.	  Such	  a	  system	  is	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  administrative	  advantage	  of	  hegemons	  with	  abundant	  resources.	  	  	  The	  wording	  contained	  in	  framework	  treaties	  is	  important,	  since	  regional	  and	  bi-­‐/multi-­‐lateral	  agreements	  governing	  watercourses	  and	  aquifers	  ‘borrow’	  from	  these	  overarching	  instruments.	  Yet,	  powerful	  actors	  can	  direct	  the	  emphasis	  given	  to	  certain	  principles	  over	  others	  during	  their	  creation.	  Such	  variations	  may	  be	  positive	  or	  negative	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  equity.	  The	  Revised	  Protocol	  on	  Shared	  Watercourses	  in	  the	  Southern	  African	  Development	  Community	  (Revised	  SADC	  Protocol	  2000),	  for	  example,	  draws	  upon	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  UN	  Watercourses	  Convention	  (1997)	  in	  its	  preamble	  and	  includes	  ERU	  and	  NSH	  language	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  UN	  formulation	  –	  but	  adds	  explicit	  attention	  to	  poverty	  alleviation,	  sustainable	  development,	  and	  the	  needs	  of	  future	  generations.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  ILC	  Draft	  Aquifer	  Articles	  (2008)	  have	  been	  recognised	  as	  influential	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Guarani	  Aquifer	  Agreement	  (2010),	  and	  its	  emphasis	  on	  sovereignty	  could	  indicate	  hydro-­‐hegemonic	  influence	  in	  its	  drafting	  and	  implementation.	  	  States’	  use	  of	  and	  engagement	  with	  the	  formation	  of	  these	  principles	  reveals	  the	  bargaining	  power	  inherent	  in	  international	  law.	  Turkey	  has	  a	  history	  of	  using	  international	  legal	  principles	  as	  soft	  power	  to	  increase	  its	  control	  over	  the	  transboundary	  waters;	  Iraq	  and	  Syria	  have	  likewise	  leveraged	  international	  water	  law	  principles	  in	  counter-­‐hydro-­‐hegemonic	  attempts	  to	  curb	  upstream	  control	  of	  the	  surface	  waters	  (Daoudy	  2008).	  Similarly,	  states’	  comments	  on	  the	  ILC	  Draft	  Aquifer	  Articles	  (2008)	  illustrate	  how	  power	  can	  be	  wielded	  through	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the	  wording	  of	  provisions.	  Ambiguous	  and	  subjective	  terms	  are	  generally	  preferred	  by	  those	  states	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  interpret	  them	  in	  their	  favour.	  More	  defined,	  narrow	  provisions	  are	  preferred	  by	  those	  with	  less	  power,	  demonstrating	  a	  possible	  reliance	  on	  the	  law	  to	  make	  up	  for	  their	  lack	  of	  influence	  in	  other	  spheres.	  Additionally,	  the	  very	  fact	  that	  hydro-­‐hegemons	  like	  Brazil	  and	  Turkey	  are	  concerned	  with	  the	  wording	  of	  legal	  instruments	  at	  all,	  in	  spite	  of	  their	  dominant	  position,	  reveals	  concern	  over	  being	  held	  accountable	  by	  legal	  principles	  and	  the	  perceived	  legitimacy	  of	  their	  actions.	  	  	  
Hydro-­‐Hegemony	  in	  other	  Fields	  of	  Law:	  The	  Fragmentation	  of	  
International	  Law	  	  Though	  the	  discussion	  above	  focused	  primarily	  on	  issues	  specific	  to	  international	  water	  law,	  many	  other	  areas	  of	  international	  law	  are	  relevant	  to	  hydro-­‐hegemony.	  Global	  water	  governance	  frames	  water	  among	  other	  things	  as	  an	  environmental,	  economic,	  and	  human	  rights	  concern.	  Managing	  and	  using	  river	  basins	  and	  aquifers	  involves	  much	  more	  than	  the	  water	  itself;	  it	  also	  has	  implications	  for	  pollution,	  land	  rights,	  biodiversity,	  and	  wetlands,	  for	  example.	  International	  environmental	  law,	  international	  human	  rights	  law,	  and	  international	  economic	  law,	  among	  others,	  all	  govern	  various	  components	  of	  freshwater	  resources	  (Boisson	  de	  Chazournes	  2013).	  The	  various	  regional	  agreements,	  domestic	  laws,	  and	  private	  sector	  regulation	  mechanisms	  also	  intersecting	  with	  shared	  waters	  further	  complicate	  matters.	  While	  the	  principle	  of	  lex	  specialis	  can	  help	  in	  determining	  which	  law	  takes	  precedence	  when	  there	  are	  both	  general	  and	  specific	  rules,	  norms	  over	  shared	  water	  have	  emerged	  in	  different	  fields	  of	  law	  holding	  equivalent	  specificity	  or	  generality.	  The	  structure	  of	  international	  law	  thus	  leads	  to	  legal	  fragmentation,	  making	  it	  unclear	  which	  rules	  are	  applicable	  when.	  	  Legal	  fragmentation	  over	  transboundary	  river	  basins	  and	  aquifers	  has	  implications	  for	  hydro-­‐hegemony.	  As	  demonstrated	  above,	  states	  divergently	  prioritise	  the	  principles	  of	  ERU,	  NSH,	  and	  sovereignty	  to	  further	  their	  own	  (counter)	  hydro-­‐hegemonic	  agendas.	  The	  fragmentation	  of	  law	  provides	  an	  even	  larger	  set	  of	  tools	  from	  which	  states	  can	  pull.	  	  	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  the	  Jordan	  River	  Basin.	  The	  region	  is	  characterised	  by	  relative	  water	  scarcity	  and	  vast	  inequalities	  between	  populations.	  Israel,	  Jordan,	  Lebanon,	  Syria,	  and	  the	  West	  Bank	  are	  all	  riparians,	  with	  Israel	  the	  clear	  hydro-­‐hegemon,	  especially	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  occupied	  West	  Bank.	  Ongoing	  debate	  over	  the	  status	  and	  legality	  of	  Israel’s	  occupation	  and	  activities	  in	  the	  West	  Bank	  includes	  disputes	  over	  the	  applicability	  of	  international	  humanitarian	  law	  and	  international	  human	  rights	  law,	  further	  fragmenting	  and	  undermining	  applicable	  international	  water	  law	  over	  the	  Jordan	  River	  Basin.	  	  ‘Water	  rights’	  are	  an	  oft-­‐used	  legal	  principle	  for	  counter-­‐hydro-­‐hegemonic	  action	  in	  the	  Jordan	  River	  Basin,	  with	  states,	  NGOs,	  and	  communities	  all	  making	  claims.	  Water	  rights,	  formulated	  in	  slightly	  different	  ways,	  are	  frequently	  applied	  in	  parallel	  legal	  provisions	  –	  including	  international	  water	  law,	  international	  human	  rights	  law,	  and	  international	  humanitarian	  law.	  The	  multiple	  emphases	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on	  rights	  to	  water	  can	  be	  a	  boon	  for	  advocates	  and	  campaigners:	  in	  this	  case,	  they	  have	  a	  number	  of	  sources	  from	  which	  to	  pull	  arguments,	  potentially	  giving	  more	  weight	  to	  their	  claims.	  But	  in	  the	  legal	  realm,	  fragmentation	  often	  diminishes	  non-­‐hegemons’	  chances	  for	  legal	  redress.	  With	  multiple	  mechanisms,	  jurisdiction	  may	  be	  passed	  between	  often	  contradictory	  arenas	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  some	  legal	  claims	  essentially	  fall	  through	  the	  cracks	  and	  may	  legitimise	  legal	  breaches.	  	  	  The	  advent	  of	  the	  law	  of	  transboundary	  aquifers	  arguably	  further	  fragments	  international	  law	  governing	  freshwater.	  Established	  international	  law	  over	  water,	  environmental,	  and	  biodiversity	  concerns	  has	  effectively	  eroded	  sovereignty	  in	  favour	  of	  attention	  to	  commonly	  held	  vital	  resources.	  Although	  the	  ILC	  Draft	  Aquifer	  Articles	  (2008)	  amount	  only	  to	  non-­‐binding	  ‘soft	  law’,	  its	  reintroduction	  of	  sovereignty	  to	  certain	  transboundary	  water	  resources	  arguably	  adds	  legitimacy	  to	  interpretations	  of	  absolute	  sovereignty	  (see	  McCaffrey	  2008).	  Thus,	  hydro-­‐hegemons	  are	  potentially	  once	  again	  able	  to	  use	  that	  principle	  as	  a	  bargaining	  power	  tool,	  although	  limited territorial sovereignty 
remains an established customary principle of international law.	  Fragmentation,	  read	  in	  this	  light,	  seemingly	  becomes	  a	  handmaiden	  to	  hydro-­‐hegemony,	  as	  contradictory	  rules	  make	  space	  for	  ‘interest-­‐based’	  interpretation,	  reflective	  of	  the	  indeterminate	  structure	  of	  law	  itself..	  Advocating	  for	  systematic	  interpretation,	  contextualising	  treaties	  with	  relevant	  external	  language	  and	  events,	  may	  help	  to	  counter	  this	  concern	  although	  the	  interpretation	  of	  those	  in	  power	  will	  tend	  to	  prevail	  	  While	  it	  is	  necessary	  for	  international	  legal	  frameworks	  to	  be	  flexible	  (after	  all,	  it	  is	  rare	  that	  ‘one	  size	  fits	  all’),	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  law	  undermines	  its	  purported	  objectivity	  and	  certainty.	  Without	  careful	  attention	  to	  the	  potential	  resultant	  harms,	  international	  legal	  fragmentation	  will	  likely	  bolster	  hydro-­‐hegemonic	  arrangements	  by	  providing	  yet	  more	  tools	  for	  hydro-­‐hegemons	  to	  leverage	  in	  their	  water	  use.	  	  
Procedural	  Rules	  and	  (Counter-­‐)Hydro-­‐Hegemonic	  Action	  	  Thus	  far,	  this	  chapter	  has	  primarily	  considered	  substantive	  rules	  of	  international	  water	  law.	  There	  are,	  however,	  a	  number	  of	  procedural	  obligations	  also	  relevant	  to	  shared	  waters	  and	  hydro-­‐hegemonic	  relations.	  International	  water	  law	  explicitly	  obliges	  a	  duty	  of	  cooperation	  on	  states,	  including	  prior	  notification	  and	  consultation	  during	  the	  planning	  of	  projects	  likely	  to	  impact	  a	  watercourse.	  Information	  sharing	  and	  the	  precautionary	  principle	  are	  also	  prominent.	  The	  overlap	  and	  fragmentation	  of	  international	  law	  suggests	  that	  procedural	  obligations	  from	  international	  environmental	  law,	  such	  as	  the	  conducting	  of	  environmental	  impact	  assessments	  and	  the	  involvement	  of	  public	  participation	  in	  decision-­‐making,	  may	  also	  be	  germane.	  	  	  Procedural	  rules	  are	  used	  by	  both	  hegemons	  and	  non-­‐hegemons	  to	  delegitimise	  and	  justify	  various	  actions.	  The	  Grand	  Ethiopian	  Renaissance	  Dam	  (GERD)	  in	  the	  Nile	  River	  Basin	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  counter-­‐hydro-­‐hegemonic	  action	  by	  Ethiopia,	  a	  move	  against	  decades	  of	  hydro-­‐hegemonic	  “bullying”	  from	  downstream	  riparian	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Egypt.	  Egypt	  has	  claimed	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  Nile’s	  water	  for	  decades,	  asserting	  historic	  rights	  based	  on	  1929	  and	  1959	  colonial	  treaties	  between	  Egypt	  and	  Sudan.	  	  	  Ethiopia’s	  announcement	  of	  the	  GERD	  was	  met	  with	  loud	  protests	  and	  even	  threats	  from	  Egypt,	  concerned	  about	  possible	  reductions	  to	  downstream	  flow.	  Egypt	  claimed	  that	  Ethiopia	  had	  acted	  unilaterally	  without	  providing	  sufficient	  prior	  notification	  and	  called	  for	  Ethiopia	  to	  halt	  to	  construction	  until	  adequate	  consultation	  and	  negotiations	  with	  riparians	  were	  satisfactorily	  concluded.	  Egypt,	  Ethiopia,	  and	  Sudan	  were	  locked	  in	  months	  of	  tensions.	  While	  an	  agreement	  has	  now	  been	  reached,	  Egypt’s	  response	  to	  the	  GERD	  demonstrates	  how	  hydro-­‐hegemons	  make	  use	  of	  procedural	  obligations	  to	  delegitimise	  actions	  threatening	  their	  favoured	  status	  quo.	  	  Egypt’s	  legal	  claims	  against	  the	  GERD	  included	  calls	  for	  a	  proper	  assessment	  of	  the	  project’s	  impacts.	  Environmental	  impact	  assessments	  (EIAs)	  are	  one	  of	  the	  strongest	  procedural	  duties	  in	  international	  environmental	  law,	  regarded	  as	  a	  necessary	  component	  of	  due	  diligence	  against	  transboundary	  harm.	  EIAs	  are	  now	  standard	  –	  and	  generally	  required	  –	  for	  any	  major	  infrastructure	  development,	  including	  dams,	  pipelines,	  and	  pumps	  (see	  ICJ	  2009	  and	  2010).	  	  Transboundary	  EIAs	  are	  a	  powerful	  way	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  harms	  of,	  and	  thus	  potentially	  push	  against,	  hydro-­‐hegemony.	  The	  procedural	  EIA	  requirement	  creates	  a	  space	  for	  negative	  impacts	  like	  reduced	  downstream	  flow	  and	  aquifer	  pollution	  to	  be	  named	  and	  mitigation	  measures	  called	  for.	  Additionally,	  the	  conducting	  of	  an	  EIA	  is	  a	  more	  static,	  strict	  rule,	  difficult	  to	  interpret	  subjectively.	  There	  is	  thus	  less	  space	  for	  a	  hydro-­‐hegemon	  to	  deny	  a	  breach	  of	  the	  EIA	  requirement.	  	  There	  is,	  however,	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  space	  for	  EIAs	  and	  other	  procedural	  rules	  to	  be	  used	  politically	  as	  well	  as	  legally,	  in	  ways	  that	  may	  further	  hydro-­‐hegemony	  rather	  than	  countering	  it.	  For	  example,	  Israel	  and	  Jordan	  recently	  signed	  an	  agreement	  for	  a	  major	  project	  to	  desalinate	  water	  from	  the	  Gulf	  of	  Aqaba	  and	  pipe	  some	  of	  it	  north	  to	  replenish	  the	  Dead	  Sea.	  	  The	  Red	  Sea-­‐Dead	  Sea	  Conveyance	  project	  was	  full	  of	  counter-­‐hydro-­‐hegemonic	  potential,	  and	  was	  certainly	  packaged	  that	  way	  to	  supporters	  at	  its	  beginning.	  An	  early	  proposal	  written	  jointly	  by	  Israel,	  Jordan,	  and	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  spoke	  of	  greater	  access	  to	  potable	  water	  for	  everyone	  and	  an	  economic	  and	  environmental	  avenue	  for	  cooperation.	  The	  World	  Bank	  administered	  a	  multi-­‐million	  dollar	  fund	  from	  multiple	  donors	  to	  conduct	  a	  feasibility	  study	  (including	  an	  environmental	  and	  social	  impact	  assessment)	  that	  emphasised	  public	  participation	  a	  great	  deal	  in	  its	  design.	  In	  December	  2013,	  Israel,	  Jordan,	  and	  Palestine	  signed	  a	  memorandum	  of	  understanding	  to	  build	  a	  conduit.	  	  	  Yet,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  all	  this	  potentially	  counter-­‐hydro-­‐hegemonic	  work,	  an	  agreement	  was	  signed	  between	  Israel	  and	  Jordan	  –	  without	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority.	  Instead	  of	  being	  an	  equal	  part	  of	  an	  agreement,	  Palestine	  may	  be	  able	  to	  broker	  a	  separate	  agreement	  with	  Israel	  to	  buy	  additional	  water.	  Such	  a	  result	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furthers	  Israel’s	  hydro-­‐hegemonic	  position	  over	  Palestine.	  This	  hydro-­‐hegemonic	  outcome	  illustrates	  the	  limitations	  of	  procedural	  rules	  to	  guard	  against	  unjust	  results.	  Potentially	  worse,	  attention	  to	  procedural	  obligations	  (even	  if	  only	  lip	  service)	  may	  solidify	  future	  hydro-­‐hegemonic	  possibilities	  by	  securing	  the	  consent	  of	  neighbouring	  riparians,	  which	  can	  in	  turn,	  limit	  future	  claims.	  Though	  the	  signed	  agreement	  deviates	  from	  the	  original	  plan,	  Israel	  can	  point	  to	  Palestine’s	  participation	  in	  the	  process	  to	  delegitimise	  future	  protests.	  	  	  The	  use	  of	  EIAs	  to	  further	  (counter-­‐)hydro-­‐hegemonic	  agendas	  also	  raises	  issues	  of	  the	  politicisation	  of	  science	  and	  information	  asymmetry.	  Water	  systems	  are	  complex,	  and	  the	  likely	  impacts	  of	  projects	  and	  utilisation	  debateable.	  A	  state	  will	  hire	  experts	  who	  will	  testify	  in	  ways	  that	  fit	  its	  agenda	  and	  focus	  on	  the	  scientific	  knowledge	  that	  most	  supports	  its	  aims.	  While	  a	  non-­‐hegemon	  may	  leverage	  the	  precautionary	  principle	  to	  push	  against	  a	  major	  project	  initiated	  by	  a	  hydro-­‐hegemon,	  that	  hydro-­‐hegemon	  may	  use	  its	  material	  power	  to	  buy	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  expert	  knowledge	  able	  to	  produce	  an	  authoritative	  EIA	  discounting	  neighbours’	  concerns.	  Information	  asymmetry	  and	  the	  capacity	  of	  more	  powerful	  states	  like	  Israel	  to	  generate	  but	  withhold	  knowledge	  further	  challenge	  counter-­‐hegemonic	  efforts.	  	  	  Procedural	  rules	  have	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  counter-­‐hydro-­‐hegemonic	  potential	  and	  can	  be	  leveraged	  as	  an	  important	  part	  of	  weaker	  states’	  bargaining	  power.	  But	  it	  is	  important	  to	  recognise	  that	  the	  political	  nature	  of	  science	  and	  procedure	  means	  that	  these	  rules	  can	  just	  as	  easily	  be	  leveraged	  by	  hydro-­‐hegemons	  to	  further	  cement	  their	  positions.	  	  Too,	  the	  very	  use	  of	  legal	  structures	  may	  reinforce	  the	  legitimacy	  held	  by	  hydro-­‐hegemons,	  as	  will	  be	  addressed	  in	  the	  next	  and	  final	  section.	  
	  
Conclusions	  	  Understanding	  the	  interplay	  between	  international	  water	  law,	  power,	  and	  hydro-­‐hegemony	  is	  vital	  to	  understanding	  water	  policy	  and	  outcomes	  on	  a	  global	  level.	  International	  water	  law,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  bodies	  of	  law,	  can	  be	  a	  source	  of	  bargaining	  power	  for	  states	  in	  transboundary	  water	  interactions.	  Legal	  principles,	  both	  substantive	  rules	  and	  procedural	  obligations,	  provide	  a	  set	  of	  norms	  to	  which	  states	  can	  refer	  in	  justifying	  or	  delegitimising	  actions.	  Given	  states’	  interest	  and	  involvement	  in	  the	  development	  of	  international	  law,	  it	  seems	  that	  even	  powerful	  states	  are	  concerned	  with	  issues	  of	  accountability,	  legitimacy,	  and	  the	  potential	  bargaining	  power	  provided	  by	  international	  law.	  	  	  As	  a	  result,	  law	  can	  serve	  both	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  justice	  and	  oppression.	  The	  fragmentation	  and	  indeterminacy	  of	  law	  (see	  Miéville	  2004	  )	  creates	  avenues	  for	  the	  exercise	  of	  soft	  power	  by	  states	  to	  develop	  legitimising	  “legal	  narratives”	  for	  their	  actions	  (Shehadeh	  1996).	  Non-­‐hegemons	  can	  leverage	  international	  law	  to	  strengthen	  their	  bargaining	  power;	  principles	  of	  international	  water	  law	  can	  help	  bolster	  counter-­‐hydro-­‐hegemonic	  advocacy	  campaigns.	  Yet,	  the	  reality	  of	  overarching	  hegemonic	  structures	  and	  extreme	  power	  asymmetries	  between	  states	  may	  limit	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  using	  law	  for	  counter-­‐hydro-­‐hegemony	  is	  effective:	  legally,	  as	  states	  with	  greater	  resources	  generally	  win	  the	  ‘duel	  of	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experts’,	  and	  practically,	  as	  being	  in	  the	  legal	  right	  is	  no	  guarantee	  of	  success	  or	  protection.	  	  	  Examining	  international	  water	  law	  and	  hydro-­‐hegemony	  together	  reveals	  the	  weakness	  of	  their	  state-­‐centred	  outlook.	  The	  imperial	  Westphalian	  system	  is	  the	  framework	  in	  place	  for	  global	  organisation,	  with	  the	  state	  the	  central	  actor.	  However,	  as	  the	  Red	  Sea-­‐Dead	  Sea	  case	  study	  demonstrates,	  semi-­‐state	  actors,	  indigenous	  peoples,	  local	  and	  municipal	  governments,	  donors,	  corporations,	  international	  and	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations,	  individuals,	  and	  ecosystems	  are	  growing	  in	  prominence	  and	  have	  agency	  in	  shaping	  outcomes.	  Trends	  such	  as	  public	  participation	  and	  international	  human	  rights	  mechanisms	  show	  the	  evolution	  of	  international	  law	  in	  recognising	  these	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  but	  states	  remain	  the	  key	  actors	  with	  legal	  personality.	  Hydro-­‐hegemony	  theory,	  too,	  has	  been	  highly	  state-­‐centric.	  States	  are	  the	  unit	  of	  analysis	  with	  virtually	  no	  attention	  to	  which	  citizens	  or	  groups	  within	  the	  state	  wield	  and	  benefit	  from	  the	  state’s	  hegemony.	  	  	  The	  world	  is	  changing,	  and	  state-­‐centric	  analyses	  can	  limit	  understanding	  of	  broader	  influences.	  Decision-­‐making	  that	  impacts	  transboundary	  waters	  occurs	  on	  all	  levels,	  not	  only	  the	  state	  level.	  In	  many	  places,	  local	  and	  municipal	  actions	  have	  greater	  impacts	  than	  national	  activities.	  Major	  development	  projects	  are	  nearly	  always	  backed	  by	  international	  organisations	  such	  as	  the	  Asian	  Development	  Bank	  or	  International	  Monetary	  Fund.	  	  	  Hydro-­‐hegemony	  theory	  must	  move	  beyond	  its	  realist	  assumptions	  of	  international	  relations	  theory	  if	  it	  is	  to	  be	  of	  continued	  use.	  Similarly,	  international	  water	  law	  must	  embrace	  developments	  and	  evolve	  if	  it	  is	  to	  continue	  being	  relevant.	  International	  law	  and	  hydro-­‐hegemony	  scholarship	  and	  practice	  must	  incorporate	  both	  more	  micro-­‐	  and	  macro-­‐level	  actors.	  When	  individuals,	  corporations,	  and	  semi-­‐states	  are	  not	  included	  in	  international	  legal	  frameworks	  and	  analysis,	  their	  place	  in	  maintaining,	  or	  being	  subject	  to,	  oppressive	  hydro-­‐hegemonic	  arrangements	  remain	  unacknowledged	  and	  unaddressed.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  emphasising	  the	  importance	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  to	  international	  water	  law	  and	  hydro-­‐hegemony,	  this	  chapter’s	  consideration	  of	  aquifers	  as	  well	  as	  river	  basins	  reinforces	  the	  importance	  of	  understanding	  geographical	  context	  as	  well	  as	  economic,	  social,	  and	  political	  factors.	  Hydro-­‐hegemony	  theory	  should	  accordingly	  develop	  a	  more	  nuanced	  appreciation	  of	  how	  riparian	  position	  and	  exploitation	  potential	  influence	  hydro-­‐hegemonic	  outcomes,	  and	  of	  the	  material	  power	  differences	  that	  arise	  between	  various	  catchment	  types.	  	  Lastly,	  but	  perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  using	  hydro-­‐hegemony	  as	  a	  lens	  to	  study	  international	  water	  law	  reveals	  the	  structural	  ways	  in	  which	  international	  law	  serves	  to	  further	  hegemonic	  arrangements.	  There	  is	  a	  violent	  relation	  in	  law	  itself:	  which	  laws	  apply,	  when,	  by	  whom,	  to	  what	  end?	  (Kennedy	  2012,	  164).	  It	  is	  precisely	  these	  questions,	  applied	  to	  transboundary	  water	  distribution,	  that	  hydro-­‐hegemony	  seeks	  to	  answer.	  The	  international	  legal	  system	  is	  political;	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  power	  relations	  that	  create	  hydro-­‐hegemonic	  realities	  and	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inequalities.	  Non-­‐hegemons	  making	  use	  of	  international	  water	  law	  as	  a	  form	  of	  bargaining	  power	  in	  counter-­‐hydro-­‐hegemony	  must	  consider	  the	  unequal	  nature	  of	  that	  law,	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  their	  use	  of	  it	  reinforces	  wider	  power	  dynamics,	  in	  their	  efforts.	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